We propose a quantitative assessment of the marginal abatement costs (MAC) of greenhouse gas emissions from European agriculture and analyze the implications of the non-ETS burden-sharing agreement (BSA) for this sector. This assessment is based on MAC reduced forms, the generic specification of which enables simple parameterization and numerical computations. Such MAC curves are parameterized for each Member State using the outputs of a detailed model of the European agricultural supply. They are then used to compute total and marginal abatement costs involved by the BSA targets, as well as the costeffective effort sharing, the corresponding emission price and abatement costs.
Introduction
According to the latest greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories by the EEA (European Environment Agency, 2010a), agricultural emissions represent about 10% of total EU emissions. The role of this sector in cost-effective mitigation policies has been increasingly emphasized in the recent years (UN-FCCC, 2008; Smith et al., 2008; European Commission, 2009) . One important characteristic of agricultural emissions is that they result from the activities of a large number of small-scale emitters.
Furthermore, the diversity in the conditions of production within and across countries leads to large heterogeneities in abatement costs. Such heterogeneities have important consequences on the design of cost-effective mitigation policies (De Cara et al., 2005) .
The recent European Climate-Energy package sets ambitious targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions (European Commission, 2008) . To meet this objective, the European Commission has defined a two-tier strategy. On the one hand, GHG emissions from large-scale emitters, mostly in the industry and the energy sectors, are currently covered by a cap-and-trade system known as the European Trading System or ETS (European Union, 2003) . On the other hand, emissions from the transport, residential, and agricultural sectors, which are much less concentrated and more difficult to monitor, are not subject to emission trading. In 2009, it was decided to reduce total EU emissions from the sectors currently not covered by the ETS by approximately 10% in 2020 relatively to 2005 levels.
This decision was accompanied with a burden-sharing agreement (BSA), which sets Member-State specific targets for non-ETS emissions (European Union, 2009 ).
In the European decision regarding the BSA, cost-effectiveness was put forth as one out of six principles guiding the establishment of the Member-State targets (along with "flexibility", "fair competition among EU industries", "fairness", "subsidiarity", and "competitiveness", see Lacasta et al., 2010 , for an analysis of the decision). The agreed targets have resulted from compromises between these principles, as well as from various political considerations that arose during the negotiations. Therefore, it is likely that the BSA targets alone will not readily permit to achieve cost-effectiveness (Tol, 2009) . How large the costs associated to the BSA targets will be in comparison with that of the cost-effective solution remains, however, an open question.
While the implementation of the ETS has given rise to many economic studies (Böhringer et al., 2006; Ellerman & Buchner, 2008; Böhringer et al., 2009; Convery, 2009) , the sectoral implications of the BSA for non-ETS emissions have received less attention so far. Capros et al. (2008) and Höglund-Isaksson et al. (2010) provide quantitative assessments of the non-ETS objectives, which have been used by the European Commission in the preparatory phase of the BSA. Tol (2009) examines the impacts of various settings of flexibility mechanisms for the non-ETS sector as a whole. The present article focuses on emissions from the agricultural sector and sheds some quantitative light on what is at stake for this sector.
The assessment of marginal abatement costs (MAC) is key to the issue of cost-effectiveness. In the environmental economics literature, empirical and analytical approaches differ in this respect. In studies falling in the latter category, MAC curves are commonly specified as linear functions, which are easy to manipulate analytically (see for instance Newell & Stavins, 2003; Tol, 2009) . By contrast, the applied economic studies that have estimated empirical MAC curves for agricultural emissions usually underline the non-linearities that prevail in their results. Moreover, linear specifications require in general additional conditions on the level of abatement to hold for some basic properties of the abatement supply to be fulfilled, e.g. that abatement does not exceed emissions. In this article, we propose an alternative, non-linear specification for MAC curves. This specification has several advantages. First, it summarizes any MAC curve with a few (three) parameters that can easily be estimated and interpreted. Second, it readily ensures that emission reductions do not exceed initial emissions without requiring additional restrictions on the value of abatement. Third, as we illustrate in this paper, the functional form fits fairly well the empirical MAC curves obtained from an applied economic model that accounts for the heterogeneities in abatement potential and costs. Last, the fitted MAC curves can be used as reduced forms to quantify the implications of a wide range of mitigation policies without the burden of having to run multiple simulations of a large-scale model.
The present paper provides an illustration of how such a specification can be used in an applied economic work. We estimate the parameters defining the MAC curve for each Member State's agricultural emissions. In the literature, empirical MAC curves have been derived from various models, including technical-economic supply-side models (De Cara et al., 2005; Hediger, 2006) , bottom-up engineering assessments of the costs and potential of abatement technologies (Beach et al., 2008; Moran et al., 2010; Höglund-Isaksson et al., 2010) , and partial or general equilibrium models (McCarl & Schneider, 2001; Schneider et al., 2007; Pérez Domínguez et al., 2009; Golub et al., 2009 ). These assessments considerably vary in scope (sources of emissions, gases, and mitigation options considered), modelling assumptions, and geographic scale and resolution. See Vermont & De Cara (2010) for a recent quantitative survey. Our estimations are based on the outputs of an updated version of the model of the European agricultural supply presented in De Cara et al. (2005) . The obtained reduced forms are then used to compute the cost-effective burden sharing across Member States, the corresponding emission price, total abatement costs, as well as the cost-savings permitted by market-based instruments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some facts about the EU 3 BSA and the distribution of non-ETS emissions. The notations are introduced and the properties of the MAC specification proposed in this paper are discussed in Section 3. The empirical model is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the fitted country-specific MAC curves. The results in terms of cost-effective burden sharing, equilibrium emission price, and total abatement costs are detailed in Section 6. A sensitivity analysis is carried out in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Emissions from agriculture and the EU non-ETS Burden Sharing Agreement
Meeting the EU objective of a 20% reduction of GHG emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels (30% if an international agreement is reached) should not rely solely on reductions in the energyintensive sectors currently covered by the ETS. The decision 406/2009/EC (European Union, 2009) stresses the importance of sharing the mitigation burden among all emitting sectors, and aims at broadening the scope of the EU climate policy to emissions from other sectors.
The wide diversity across Member States in terms of per-capita GDP and expected growth involves large differences among Member States in terms of (total and per-capita) GHG emissions, decomposition by gas, sector, and sources (European Environment Agency, 2010a). Table 1 illustrates this diversity for non-ETS and agricultural emissions. In 2005, agricultural emissions account for more than one sixth of total non-ETS emissions. The share of agriculture in non-ETS emissions varies from 6.7% (Luxembourg) to 43% (Ireland). It is slightly higher on average in the New Member States (19%) than in the rest of the EU. Four countries (France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Spain) account for more than half of total European agricultural emissions. Agricultural emissions in the New Member States represent slightly less than 20% of total EU agricultural emissions, the largest emitting countries in this group being Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
The variety of the countries' situations with respect to non-ETS emissions has led the EU to adopt a set of differentiated targets to comply with its overall abatement objective. The EU decision regarding the BSA explicitly refers to the differences in (current and expected) per-capita GDP among Member States as the main justification of setting less stringent targets for the Member States characterized by lower per-capita GDP (preamble, paragraph 8).
The agreed abatement targets for non-ETS emissions are reported in Table 1 two of these countries-Denmark and Ireland-are also characterized by the highest share of agricultural emissions in non-ETS emissions among EU-15 countries (about 28% and 43%, respectively).
The application of the BSA targets to the non-ETS emissions as computed in Table 1 Cost-effectiveness implies that MAC are equalized across countries and across sectors. Given the heterogeneity of abatement costs and potentials, one may expect the cost-effective abatement effort to considerably vary from one country or sector to the other. Nothing ensures that the BSA targetswhich are largely based on relative per-capita GDP-will readily correspond to a cost-effective effort sharing. Meeting the EU target in a cost-effective manner will thus require flexibility mechanisms across countries and sectors. Although cost-effectiveness is put forth as one key principle in the EU BSA, it is not yet clear how it could be articulated with the subsidiarity principle and whether the provisions regarding flexibility mechanisms would permit to achieve full cost-effectiveness (Tol, 2009 ).
Abatement supply and abatement costs
In this section, we introduce the notations and computations used in the empirical application. We denote by E 0i the base-year agricultural GHG emissions (in MtCO 2 eq) in country i (i = 1, . . . , n).
When an emission price p (in C/tCO 2 eq) is introduced, farmers respond by adjusting their production choices. The corresponding base-year emissions for country i are denoted by
For the ease of inter-country comparison, it will be useful to normalize emission reductions and use the abatement rate defined as:
We posit the following specification for the abatement supply:
Under the assumptions that 0 <ᾱ i ≤ 1, β i > 0 and τ i > 0, equation (2) ensures that the abatement supply 2 is positive and increasing with respect to p. If β i > 1, the abatement supply function has an inflexion point at p = τ i
When the emission price tends to infinity, the abatement rate in country i tends toᾱ i . Therefore,ᾱ i E 0i represents the maximum technically feasible abatement, which is possibly lower than base emissions, and (1 −ᾱ i )E 0i represents the amount of incompressible
emissions. An essential feature of specification (2) is that it readily ensures that "one cannot abate more than one emits" (provided thatᾱ i ≤ 1). Formulations that are generally used in the literature- The responsiveness of the abatement supply can be (locally) characterized by the relative change in the abatement rate due to a 1% change in the emission price. Using specification (2), the price elasticity of the abatement rate (
Equation (3) indicates that µ i depends only on β i and
and is decreasing with respect to
. For the range of values we shall explore in sections 5 and 6, µ i (p) is increasing with respect to β i . Another indicator of the price response of α i (p)-which may be easier to interpret-is the price elasticity of
. Using equation (1), it can be easily shown that:
The MAC curve (as a function of the abatement rate) is obtained by inverting (2):
2 Note that whenᾱ i = 1, equation (2) is similar to the definition of the cumulative distribution function of a Weibull distribution with shape and scale parameters equal to β i and τ i , respectively.
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As α approaches the maximum abatement rateᾱ i , the marginal abatement cost tends to infinity. The role of τ i as a scaling factor is apparent in equation (5). Holding all other parameters constant, a greater value of τ i implies a higher MAC for the same abatement rate.
Assuming that fixed costs of abatement are zero, total abatement costs (in MC) for country i and any abatement rate 0 ≤ α <ᾱ i are:
Using equation (5) and a simple change of variable, total abatement costs can be expressed as a function of the parameters defining the abatement supply function:
where γ(x, z) is the (lower) incomplete Gamma function defined as:
Although equation (7) does not provide a closed form for total abatement costs when β 1, numerical computations can be easily performed using standard statistical softwares provided that the values of E 0i ,ᾱ i , β i , and τ i are known.
For any given abatement targetα, the cost-effective vector of country abatement rates (α * 1 , . . . , α * n ) is characterized by
Given the non-linearity of (5), getting an analytical solution 3 of (9) is less straightforward than under a linear MAC specification. However, as will be illustrated in Section 6, it is possible in practice to get a convergent numerical solution of (9) by selecting well-chosen starting values for α * i . The cost-effective abatement rates α * i and the corresponding MAC can thus be obtained numerically. The equalization of MAC across countries corresponds to the outcome of a (well-functioning) emission trading system. It is then possible to assess the cost-savings permitted by market-based instruments. Consider that a burden sharing vector (α 1 , . . . ,α n ) such that kαk E 0k =α k E 0k has been agreed upon. Consider also that a cap-and-trade system is implemented with initial allowances defined by (α 1 , . . . ,α n ). In this case, country i will have to buy (sell) permits ifα i > α * i (α i < α * i ). The net amount paid by country i when permits are traded at equilibrium price p * (p * = C i (α * i ) for all i) is:
3 Existence of a solution to (9) for 0 ≤α < min iᾱi is ensured by the continuity of C i () and the assumption that C i (0) = 0 for all i. The monotonicity of C i () for all i implies that the solution, when it exits, is unique.
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The net gain from trade for country i is thus:
In absence of transaction costs, the net gain from trade is-by construction-unambiguously non-negative for all i. As the net transfers sum to zero, the sum of net gains across countries reduces to the total (2) is defined for an instantaneous reduction in base-year (t = 0) emissions. The framework presented above can easily be extended to the case of a reduction commitment at a future date and changing-over-time BAU emissions. Consider that the abatement target applies to the emissions at some future date t = T relative to base-year emissions E 0i . We denote byÊ T i the BAU emissions at date T , which may be smaller or greater than E 0i due to changes in some exogenous drivers. We denote byλ i the expected reduction rate in BAU emissions between t = 0 and t = T , so that:
We assume that the only impact of the exogenous changes in emissions is to shift the supply curve (expressed in relative terms) upward or downward such thatα i (0) =λ i . The modified abatement supply is thus:α
which leads to the corresponding (modified) MAC curve:
The (modified) total abatement costs are obtained by integrating (14):
The second case in (15) corresponds to the presence of 'hot air' in the sense that the expected decrease in BAU emissions alone is sufficient to meet the abatement target. The first case corresponds to a real abatement effort as α ≥λ i . If country i's BAU emissions are expected to decrease (λ i > 0), only the abatement beyondλ i entails abatement costs. In other words,λ i E 0i represents the amount of 'free' abatement for country i. In case of increasing BAU emissions (λ i < 0), the abatement effort must more than offset the extra burden due to the expected increase in BAU emissions.
The exogenous changes in BAU emissions have an impact on equilibrium quantities and prices, as well as on the distribution of transfers and net gains of trade across countries. Holding all other parameters constant, countries that are characterized by a decrease in BAU emissions (λ i > 0) can sell more permits on the market at no additional cost. On the contrary, countries characterized byλ i < 0 have to buy more permits to offset the increase in their BAU emissions.
The model
The Cara et al., 2005) . In Section 7, we shall conduct sensitivity analyses of the results with two alternative values of δ.
The emission coverage includes the main sources of non-CO 2 GHG emissions directly caused by agricultural activities: methane (CH 4 ) emissions from enteric fermentation, manure management, and rice cultivation; nitrous oxide (N 2 O) emissions from agricultural soil and manure management.
Emission accounting methods and the choice of emission factors are consistent with the informationwhenever available-contained in the individual Member States' GHG inventories. When this information is lacking, the IPCC guidelines and default factors are used (Eggleston et al., 2006) . Emissions of to the abatement potential that can be achieved at a given emission price.
Marginal abatement cost functions
The functional form (2) is then fitted using the levels of the emission price and the corresponding simulated values of the abatement rate aggregated at the Member State, EU-15, New Member State, and EU-wide levels. The results of the non-linear fit are presented in Table 3 . 6 We first focus on the EU-aggregated results. The simulated abatement supply (dots) and fitted values (solid line) for the EU are presented in Figure 1 .a for the full range of emission prices. The maximum abatement rate is estimated to be approximately 60% of the base emissions. The estimated parameters imply that approximately a third of this potential abatement is exhausted at a price of 100 C/tCO 2 eq. The abatement supply function does not have an inflexion point, as β < 1. Based on the estimated parameters, the emission price that corresponds to a 10% reduction in EU base emissions is about 41.1 C/tCO 2 eq. At this price, the implied price elasticity of the abatement rate is approximately µ = 0.7. This corresponds to a price elasticity of emissions η = −0.076. These figures can be compared with the results of the meta-analysis by Vermont & De Cara (2010) , who estimated µ and η (for the same abatement rate) to be approximately 0.6 and -0.066, respectively.
The estimation results also indicate that the maximum abatement rate is higher in the New Member
States as a whole than in the EU-15 (about 66% and 59%, respectively). by lower abatement costs in the New Member States, which were seldom included in previous analyses in the literature. 6 The MAC curves are fitted with R 2.11.1 using the non-linear least squares function provided in package stats. 7 The confidence interval is reconstructed from the log-log abatement supply function estimated by Vermont & De Cara (Table 4 , Model 6, standard error: 0.5624) taking all explanatory variables used by these authors at their mean values except the spatial dummies (EU set to 1, USA and ROW set to 0). 
Cost-effective Burden Sharing
Using the vector of abatement rates negotiated under the BSA agreement (Table 1, fifth column) and the estimated base-year emissions (Table 2 , second column), the implied 2020 aggregate target corresponds to a 10.1% reduction in emissions compared to 2005 levels. We now turn to the costeffective solution that allows to reach the same abatement rate at the minimum total cost.
To numerically solve the non-linear system (9), we proceed in three steps. We first compute the emission price p 0 = C m EU (α) that corresponds to the aggregate target using the fitted MAC curve at the EU level and defined by the estimated parameter values reported in Table 2 (last row) . Second, we compute the corresponding abatement rate for each country as α 0 i = α i (p 0 ) using equation (2) and the country-specific parameters reported in Table 2 . By construction, the resulting vector (α 0 1 , . . . , α 0 n ) satisfies the first (n − 1) equations of system (9) (equalization of MAC across countries), but does not satisfy in general the last equation of (9) because of the non linearity of the abatement supply.
Nevertheless, it provides a close enough starting vector for the numerical solution to converge. The last step thus consists in numerically solving the full system (9) using (α 0 1 , . . . , α 0 n ) as starting values for (α * 1 , . . . , α * n ). 8 Figure 2 provides a comparison of the BSA targets (x-axis) and the cost-effective abatement rates (y-axis) in two situations. In Figure 2 .a, the equilibrium is obtained assuming constant BAU emissions 8 The non-linear system is solved within R 2.11.1 using the package nleqslv.
14 and abatement costs between 2005 and 2020. In this case, the equilibrium price is 42.4 C/tCO 2 eq. In Figure 2 .b, the changes in BAU emissions (λ i ) are set to match the values derived from the GAINS projections (Table 1, Detailed results are presented in Table 3 . Again, we distinguish between whether the changes in BAU emissions are accounted for (right) or not (left). The MAC corresponding to the BSA targets are reported in the columns labeledĈ m i (α i ) and C m i (α i ), respectively. These figures may be interpreted as the emission tax that each country would have to set in order to fulfill its commitment in absence of flexibility among EU Member States. They range from 0 to more than 200 C/tCO 2 eq. All countries that have been assigned a negative BSA target are also characterized byα i ≤λ i . Marginal and total abatement costs to meet the BSA target are thus zero in these countries. The largest total abatement costs are faced by the largest emitters (France, Germany, the United Kingdom), but also by smaller emitters that have been assigned stringent targets (Denmark, The Netherlands, Ireland). Under the BSA and no flexibility, total abatement costs amount to almost 1,640 MC when changes in BAU emission are not accounted for, and about 1,220 MC when they are. In both cases, the burden bears almost entirely on EU-15 countries.
The cost-effective abatement rate varies considerably from one country to the other, ranging from -0.1% (Cyprus) to 24.4% (Slovenia) when accounting for the expected changes in BAU emissions.
This again illustrates the diversity of MAC curves at the country level. The aggregated cost-effective abatement rates are of similar magnitude for the EU-15 as a whole (10.1% if BAU emissions are constant until 2020, 10.3% if not) and for the New Member States (9.9% and 8.9%) despite the significant differences that exist within these two groups. As for EU-15 countries, the total abatement costs associated with the cost-effective solution are two to three times lower than the respective abatement costs under the BSA and no flexibility. EU-wide cost savings are estimated to amount to about 870 MC with constant BAU emissions, and about 750 MC if the expected changes in BAU emissions are accounted for.
Should a cap-and-trade system be implemented and allowances be based on the BSA targets, it would imply transfers from EU-15 countries to the New Member States. All countries in the latter categories would be selling permits (except Cyprus if changes in BAU emissions are accounted for), while almost all EU-15 countries would be net buyers. Interestingly, the quantity of traded permits is fairly robust to the changes in BAU emissions. It would represent over a third of the overall abatement target (13.9 MtCO 2 eq if BAU emissions are constant and 13.5 MtCO 2 eq if not). The change in the total value of transfers between the two situations examined in Table 3 (588 and 436 MC, respectively) is thus mainly due to the change in the unit permit price in equilibrium (from 42.4 to 32.2 C/tCO 2 eq). (Ê 2020,i ). An important share of the traded volume is made of hot air, which occurs when BAU emissions are lower than the assigned emission target, or using our notations when i is such thatα i ≤λ i . The volume of hot air for country i is thus (λ i −α i )E 0i . Taking the changes in BAU emissions as predicted by GAINS, hot air represents almost 60% of the transfers. At the country level, this share ranges from 1% (Greece) to 80% (Estonia). The highest amounts of hot air are found in Poland (for a value of 99 MC at equilibrium price), the Czech Republic (43 MC), and Hungary (33 MC).
Countries that gain the most from the implementation of a cap-and-trade system compared to the no-flexibility case are of two categories: (i) countries with low abatement costs and generous targets, and (ii) those with high abatement costs and stringent targets. The former gain through the sale of permits (possibly in the form of hot air). The latter save on expensive domestic abatement by buying permits to comply with their commitment. Our results indicate that Poland and the Czech Republic fall in the first category, while Denmark and the Netherlands are in the second one.
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we carry out a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the results presented above. We examine the impacts various levels of the overall abatement target for EU agriculture (α).
We also vary the livestock numbers adjustment factor (δ), which affects the abatement potential and costs for each farm-type. These changes are combined with the two previously used assumptions regarding the rate of decrease in BAU emissions between 2005 and 2020 (λ i either set to 0 or to the value predicted from GAINS).
The EU climate-energy package contains the provision that, should a significant international agreement on GHG mitigation be reached, the EU overall abatement target would be revised upward from 20% to 30%. Such a change would certainly affect the overall abatement target for non-ETS emissions, although the details of its implication for the BSA have been left for further negotiations.
Moreover, the non-ETS abatement target covers not only agriculture but also all sectors not covered by the EU cap-and-trade system. Therefore, reductions achieved in other sectors will influence the abatement required from agriculture.
We vary the value ofα from 0.5% to 25% (by step of 0.5%). Note that individual country targets α i are changed proportionally so that the relative distribution of the effort is not modified. Aggregate results forα = 5% andα = 15% are reported in Table 4 . Most of the qualitative comments made above still hold. The set of Member States which benefit from hot air is quite robust to the chosen value of α. Increasing the abatement target from 5% to 15% implies an increase in equilibrium emission price from 18.4 to 69.3 C/tCO 2 eq if BAU emissions are assumed to be constant, and from 9.9 to 57.7 C/tCO 2 eq if the expected changes predicted by GAINS are used. Total cost savings are much more sensitive to the choice of the overall target. They are multiplied almost ten times as a result of a tripling of the abatement target, reaching approximately 1840 MC whenα = 15%.
The livestock numbers adjustment factor (δ) defines the admissible range of variation in animal numbers relative to the base situation and, therefore, influences the frontier of mitigation possibilities.
Both marginal and total abatement costs are likely to be affected by a change in this parameter. As reducing livestock numbers is one straightforward means of reducing enteric fermentation and manure related GHG emissions, a larger value of δ is likely to decrease marginal abatement costs, and therefore lead to lower value of the equilibrium price.
We complement the reference simulation (δ = 0.15), with two additional sets of simulations (δ = 0 and δ = 0.3). The case δ = 0 corresponds to a situation where animal numbers are fixed to base levels, leaving changes in animal feeding as the only way of mitigating animal related emissions. By contrasting results from this case with that of the reference simulation, one can assess the additional abatement permitted by higher flexibility in adjusting livestock numbers. The resulting country-specific estimated parameters are given in Appendix (Table 6 ). The main impact of higher values of δ is to shift the maximum abatement rateᾱ. The corresponding aggregate results are reported in Table 5 . A higher value of δ tends to decrease marginal and total abatement costs. As an illustration, when changes in BAU emissions are accounted for, increasing δ from 0 to 0.3 reduces the total cost of the BSA without flexibility instruments by 24% (from about 1,430 to 1,090 MC ) and the equilibrium emission price by 20% (from 37 to 29.5 C/tCO 2 eq).
The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in Figure 3 , which presents the cost-saving 
) for all the explored values ofα i , δ andλ i . For the whole range of parameter values, this ratio is above 2, indicating that reaching the same abatement target would be at least twice as expensive if no intra-EU flexibility instruments are adopted. This ratio is even higher when accounting for the expected changes in BAU agricultural emissions between 2005 and 2020.
The assumption regarding the animal number adjustment factor has a lesser impact on the cost-saving ratio than the expected change in BAU emissions.
Concluding remarks
In this text, we have carried out a quantitative assessment of marginal abatement costs of GHG emissions from European agriculture and analyzed the implications of the EU burden sharing agreement for this sector. To do so, a generic specification of MAC curves was proposed. The retained specification provides an alternative to simpler forms previously used in analytical studies. Yet, it enables fairly easy parameterization and numerical computations. A set of parameterized MAC curves for agricultural emissions at the Member State level have been estimated using the outputs of a detailed supply-side model of the European agriculture. Based on these reduced forms, we have assessed the total and marginal abatement costs associated with the BSA, as well as the cost-effective burden sharing and the corresponding equilibrium emission price and abatement costs.
Our findings are threefold. First, the heterogeneity of MAC across Member States stands out as an important feature. As the agreed targets under the BSA do not reflect the heterogeneity of agricultural MAC at the Member State level, the use of flexibility instruments may provide substantial cost-savingscompared to the strict implementation of each individual country's target. Second, the range of equilibrium emission price at which the EU 10% reduction target can be reached in European agriculture (32-42 C/tCO 2 eq) is in line with results from analyses covering all non-ETS sectors (40 C/tCO 2 eq in Capros et al., 2008; Tol, 2009) , and lower than that found in previous studies focusing on EU agriculture (55 and 73 C/tCO 2 eq in De Cara et al., 2005; Pérez Domínguez et al., 2009 , respectively, for an 8% reduction target). This suggests that the agricultural sector could play an important role in meeting the overall EU target in a cost-effective manner. Third, the use of the BSA targets as a basis for allocating allowances in a cap-and-trade system for agricultural emissions may have important distributional consequences. In particular, this would involve significant amounts of hot air and substantial transfers from EU-15 countries to New Member States. The latter result is of course conditional on the distribution of abatement costs and potential in the other sectors not currently covered by the EU ETS, such as the transport and residential sectors.
As the MAC curves used in this paper are derived from a supply-side model, they do not account for the market responses to reductions in agricultural emissions. Accounting for these would require a partial or general equilibrium approach. The results of the meta-analysis by Vermont & De Cara (2010) indicate that this would tend to further reduce marginal abatement costs, and thus strengthen the role that agriculture could play in the cost-effective mitigation mix. Lastly, it is sometimes argued that the greater uncertainty that prevails in the accounting of agricultural emissions could impede the inclusion of this sector in a cap-and-trade system (Monni et al., 2007) . The cost-savings ratio found in the present paper suggests that it may be worth carefully weighing the extra costs caused by uncertainty and the gains permitted by market-based instruments. Further research is needed in this direction. 
